Planning and managing primary care services: lessons from the NHS in England by Checkland, Kath et al.
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Checkland, Kath and Mcdermott, Imelda and Coleman, Anna and Warwick-Giles, Lynsey and
Bramwell, Donna and Allen, Pauline and Peckham, Stephen  (2018) Planning and managing primary
care services: lessons from the NHS in England.   Public Money & Management .    ISSN 0954-0962.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2018.1449467




Public Money and Management  ? accepted 30-9-17 





1. Kath Checkland (katherine.checkland@manchester.ac.uk) is a Professor of Health Policy & 
Primary Care, Health Policy, Politics & Organisation Research Group (HiPPO), Centre for 
Primary Care, University of Manchester, UK. 
2. Imelda McDermott (Imelda.Mcdermott@manchester.ac.uk) is a Research Fellow in the 
Health Policy, Politics & Organisation Research Group (HiPPO), Centre for Primary Care, 
University of Manchester, UK. 
3. Anna Coleman (anna.coleman@manchester.ac.uk) is a Senior Research Fellow in the Health 
Policy, Politics & Organisation Research Group (HiPPO), Centre for Primary Care, University 
of Manchester, UK. 
4. Lynsey Warwick-Giles (lynsey.warwick-giles@manchester.ac.uk) is a Research Associate in 
the Health Policy, Politics & Organisation Research Group (HiPPO), Centre for Primary Care, 
University of Manchester, UK. 
5. Donna Bramwell (donna.bramwell@manchester.ac.uk) is an Honorary Research Associate in 
the Health Policy, Politics & Organisation Research Group (HiPPO), Centre for Primary Care, 
University of Manchester, UK. 
6. Pauline Allen (Pauline.Allen@lshtm.ac.uk) is a Professor of Health Services Organisation and 
Head of the Department of Health Services Research and Policy, London School of Hygiene & 
Tropical Medicine, UK. 
7. Stephen Peckham (S.Peckham@kent.ac.uk) is a Professor of Health Policy, Centre for Health 
Services Studies, University of Kent, UK. 
 
Corresponding author: 
Kath Checkland (katherine.checkland@manchester.ac.uk) 
 
Acknowledgement: 
This research is funded by the Policy Research Programme of the Department of Health. The views 
expressed are those of the researchers and not necessarily those of the Department of Health. 
 
Postal address:  
University of Manchester 
Health Policy, Politics & Organisation Group (HiPPO) 
Centre for Primary Care 
6th floor Williamson Building 
Manchester M13 9PL 
 
  
Public Money and Management  ? accepted 30-9-17 
Planning and managing primary care services: lessons from the NHS in 
England 
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Summary 
High quality primary care services are an essential part of a successful health service. However, the 
planning and management of such services is complex. Using evidence from a study of recent 
extensive changes in the English NHS we highlight the need for local service oversight by managers 
who understand local conditions and needs. We also suggest that the recent English experience 
supports an incremental policy adjustment approach rather than wholesale organisational change.  
 
Introduction 
It is generally agreed that access to high quality primary care is vital in the quest to provide the best 
possible health care at the lowest cost (Starfield et al., 2005, World Health Organisation, 2008). 
Finding new ways to deliver and extend access to primary care services is of high priority in many 
health systems (Schoen et al., 2007, Shortell et al., 2010). The United Kingdom (UK) is no exception, 
and the past 30 years has seen a wide range of initiatives focused upon primary care  ? particularly 
services provided by primary care physicians, GPs. Some initiatives have focused upon payment 
models, altering contracts in an effort to change behaviour (Gillam et al., 2012, Heins et al., 2009). 
Others  have focused upon the planning side, repeatedly enlarging, shrinking and reorganising the 
organisations with responsibility for commissioning/purchasing primary care services on behalf of a 
population (Wilkin et al., 2004). In this paper we explore the latest of these policy and organisational 
changes, presenting the findings from an empirical study investigating recent changes to the 
commissioning of primary care services in England. Using an historical account of mechanisms to 
plan and manage GP services in England, we identify some of the issues involved. We explore the 
espoused logic underpinning the current reforms, and present early evidence about their 
implementation, highlighting the extent to which they may meet official aims and address the 
identified issues. The contribution offered is twofold. Firstly, we offer an account of the 
development of planning and management of GP services in England, bringing clarity to a complex 
field and providing valuable evidence for those responsible for overseeing primary care services in 
the UK and internationally. Secondly, our exploration of the implementation of the latest round of 
reforms provides some lessons about the interplay between local, regional and national planning, 
and about the ways in which policy is made and implemented.  
 
What follows is divided into five sections. An historical account of GP services in the UK is followed 
by a short description of recent NHS reforms in England. Study methods are then described, 
followed by results. A final section discusses our findings in context, and draws lessons for the 
English NHS and for primary care service provision more widely.  
 
Planning and managing primary care services in England: an historical account 
 
The current primary care system in England arose out of the decision made at the establishment of 
the NHS in 1947 to allow GPs to be contractors to the NHS rather than employees. This enabled GPs 
to remain independent, minimising their opposition to the NHS (Lewis, 1997, Peckham and 
Exworthy, 2003). Treatment in primary care is free at the point of use, apart from a small number of 
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co-payments (e.g. a prescription charge). From 1948-1990 there was little local oversight of GP 
services, with payments governed by a manual setting out conditions for payment.  This represented 
the accretion over time of regulations and payments which were nationally set. The distribution of 
GPs was decided by the Medical Practices Committee, a national non-departmental public body 
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.dh.gov.uk/ab/Archive/MPC/index.htm). The 
Committee was responsible for giving permission for the setting up of new practices, with those 
areas of the country deemed to have sufficient coverage said ƚŽďĞ ?ĐůŽƐĞĚ ? ?There was little active 
planning to ensure population coverage, and no local oversight.  
 
In 1990, the Conservative Government imposed a new GP contract  (Hannay et al., 1992), known as 
thĞ ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŵĞĚŝĐĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ?'D^. It introduced two elements: target payments for some 
services such as vaccinations; and payment for delivering specific services such as pro-active care for 
chronic diseases. This introduced some elements of locaůĐŽŶƚƌŽůŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ǁŝƚŚůŽĐĂů ?&ĂŵŝůǇ
,ĞĂůƚŚ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌĂĐĐƌĞĚŝƚŝŶŐ'W-run chronic disease clinics and for 
administering resulting payments. By the end of the 1990s, GP morale was low (Sibbald et al., 2003), 
and a new contract was negotiated between the Department of Health and the British Medical 
ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?'WƐ ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞďŽĚǇ ? ? 
 
The resulting 2004 new national GMS contract has been comprehensibly described elsewhere (Lewis 
and Gillam, 2002). It combined a basic payment (calculated by a formula) with additional payments 
for meeting quality thresholds (the Quality and Outcomes Framework, QOF) and for providing a 
ranŐĞŽĨĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ?ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ? ?ƌƵĐŝĂůůǇ ?ůŽĐĂůŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ
 ?ƐŽŽŶŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ?WƌŝŵĂƌǇĂƌĞdƌƵƐƚƐ ? ?WdƐ ? had the discretion to develop local service schemes in 
the community to replace or supplement secondary care services. Alongside the nationally 
negotiated GMS contract, PCTs had local flexibility in two additional contract types: Personal 
Medical Services (PMS); and Alternative Providers of Medical Services (APMS). PMS contracts 
theoretically allowed local management authorities to negotiate specific contracts with GP practices. 
These were intended to increase flexibility, allowing, for example, specific services to be 
commissioned for hard to reach populations and enabling the greater performance management of 
practices (Campbell et al., 2005).  In practice, PMS contracts, once negotiated, were not policed, and 
they tended to act to entrench income inequalities between practices (Majeed et al., 2012).  APMS 
cŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐǁĞƌĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĨŽƌ ?ŶŽŶ-ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐŽĨƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĐĂƌĞ ?including private companies. 
They were introduced in 2004 to encourage the setting up of new practices ŝŶ ?ƵŶĚĞƌ-ĚŽĐƚŽƌĞĚ ?
areas (Department of Health, 2006). They were the preferred means of procuring additional GP 
services throughout the 2000s, and in part their use was intended to increase competitive pressures 
on traditional GP practices (Coleman et al., 2013).   
 
Thus, through the 2000s, policy focused upon introducing mechanisms to support the local planning 
and quality improvement of primary care services. However, freedom remained constrained by the 
national negotiation of the base contract, which accounted for the major proportion of practice 
income. FůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĨŽĐƵƐĞĚƵƉŽŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ ?ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞs, and on procuring new practices via 
APMS contracts.   
 
This brief historical account has highlighted some of the issues associated with planning and 
managing primary care services. Two issues stand out. Firstly, primary care in England is a system 
ǁŚŝĐŚĞǆŚŝďŝƚƐ ?ƉĂƚŚĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇ ?(David, 1985, Tuohy, 1999). The initial establishment of GPs as 
independent contractors to the NHS has been resilient in the face of change, leading to the current 
patchwork of contract types and add on payments.  Each new policy iteration has incrementally 
adjusted this system, with new policies addressing particular problems rather than taking an 
overview of the whole system. dŚŝƐĨŝƚƐǁŝƚŚ>ŝŶĚďůŽŵ ?ƐĐůĂƐƐŝĐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇĂƐ ?ŵƵĚĚůŝŶŐ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?(Lindblom, 1959), advancing via small, step by step changes (Lindblom, 1979). Lindblom 
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argues that such incremental change is indeed desirable (Lindblom, 1959), identifying with what 
Simon later called  ?ďŽƵŶĚĞĚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?(Simon, 1984), and ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ P ? ? ?ĐŽŵƉůĞǆƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĐĂŶŶŽƚ
ďĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚǁĞƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŶĞĞĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐĨŽƌƐŬŝůĨƵůŝŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞŶĞƐƐ ?(Lindblom, 
1979 p524).  
 
Secondly, since 1990, the English NHS has combined local responsibility for planning with national 
responsibility for payment mechanisms and amounts, with local planners only able to shift resources 
at the margins. Changes at these margins may have some impact (Checkland et al., 2011), but room 
for local financial manoeuvre has historically been limited. This left local planners with few levers 
with which to enact change, and in their absence, local relationships and an understanding of the 
history that these reflect become increasingly important (Best et al., 2012).  
 
The commissioning of primary care services since 2010 
 
In 2010, the Coalition government introduced an extensive reform of the NHS (Timmins, 2012). The 
driver for the changes was a desire to bring GPs more closely into the commissioning of hospital 
services. It was claimed that front-ůŝŶĞĐůŝŶŝĐŝĂŶƐǁŽƵůĚďĞ ?ůŝďĞƌĂƚĞĚ ?ĨƌŽŵŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůĐŽŶƚƌŽů
(Department of Health, 2010), and thus able to improve quality of services. The Health and Social 
Care Act 2012 (HSCA12) created new commissioning organisations, known as Clinical Commissioning 
Groups (CCGs), replacing PCTs. TŚĞƐĞǁĞƌĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚĂƐ ?ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?with local GP 
practices as members (Checkland et al., 2013). Hence, it was argued that, whilst CCGs would take on 
responsibility for commissioning most health care services, it would be inappropriate for them to 
commission primary care services, because of the associated potential conflicts of interest 
(Department of Health, 2010). It was also argued that local variations in funding and services 
required a more standardised national approach to commissioning primary care (NHS 
Commissioning Board, 2012). Responsibility for this was therefore given to a new national 
organisation, NHS England (NHSE, known as the NHS Commissioning Board in statute), with these 
commissioning functions discharged by ƐƚĂĨĨǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŝŶ ?>ŽĐĂůƌĞĂTĞĂŵƐ ? ?NHSE would thus 
combine a consistent and standardised national approach with appropriate local flexibility: 
 
Having a consistent approach will also help us tackle unwarranted variation and take 
positive steps towards raising the overall standard of primary care provision to the level of 
the best ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐĨŽƌĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƚŽďĞŵĂĚĞĂƐ
ůŽĐĂůůǇĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞŵĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ? ? ?ǇŝŶĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ
the national approach with the views and experiences of those commissioning and 
providing primary care services and those receiving care, we will ensure local 
implementation feels both relevant and owned by those delivering it.(NHS Commissioning 
Board, 2012 p4) 
 
This situation did not last long. In October 2014 it was announced that NHS England would be cutting 
staff and merging Local Area Teams into four Regional Teams, covering large geographical areas 
(West and Calkin, 2014). This effectively ended the possibility of  ?ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůŽĐĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ?(NHS 
Commissioning Board, 2012 p10) between primary care providers and NHS England commissioners, 
with smaller numbers of NHSE staff covering large geographical areas. 
 
At around the same time, NHSE ŝƐƐƵĞĚĂ ?Call to Action ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐthe need for more CCG 
involvement in commissioning primary care services.  On 1st May 2014 the head of NHSE, Simon 
Stevens, announced ƚŚĂƚ'ƐǁŽƵůĚŐĞƚ ?ŶĞǁƉŽǁĞƌƐ ?ƵŶĚĞƌĂŶĞǁcommissioning initiative (Co-
commissioning) and asked CCGs to consider the additional responsibilities they would like to 
assume. A letter to CCGs set out the issues: 
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 S/ĨǁĞǁĂŶƚƚŽďĞƚƚĞƌŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĐĂƌĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ?ĂŶĚƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ?
community and mental health services - at a time when overall funding is inevitably 
constrained - we need to make it easier for patients, local communities and local clinicians 
to exercise more clout over how services are developed. That means giving local CCGs 
greater influence over the way NHS funding is being invested for their local populations. 
 ? ?^ŽƚŽĚĂǇ/ĂŵŝŶǀŝƚŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞ'ƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶĂŶĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚƌŽůĞŝŶƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĐĂƌĞ
to come forward and show how new powers would enable them to drive up the quality of 
care, cut health inequalities in primary care, and help put their local NHS on a sustainable 
path for the next five years and beyond.(Roughton and Hakin, 2014 p6) 
 
dŚƵƐ ?ƚŚĞ ?ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ƚŽďĞƐŽůǀĞĚ was couched in terms of a need for greater local influence over 
service development. The need for standardisation no longer figured, and it was argued that CCGs 
needed the opportunity to invest in local services. Importantly, there was to be no associated 
legislative change; statutory responsibility for commissioning primary care services remains with 
NHSE. 
 
To return to the issues highlighted in our historical review, recent developments represent a further 
example of incremental policy adjustment, albeit within a very short timescale  ? the new approach 
was announced less than a year after the HSCA12 changes were enacted.  Furthermore, the new 
arrangements are a move back towards a local model of service planning, with an attenuation of the 
role of national organisations.  
 
Against this background, we undertook an early study of the development of primary care co-
commissioning by CCGs (McDermott et al., 2016). The focus of the study was: 
x To explore the rationale underlying the delegation of commissioning responsibility to CCGs; 
x To explore the early experiences of CCGs developing their plans for the commissioning of 
primary care services. 
 
In the following sections we report the findings from our study, returning in the discussion to the 
issues surrounding the planning and management of GP services identified in the historical review 
above, asking: what can we learn from the recent experience of changes to primary care service 




The study included three elements: analysis of relevant policy documents; interviews with senior 
policy makers; and a telephone survey of senior leaders from a sample of CCGs.  
 
We obtained the published policy guidance relating to primary care co-commissioning (NHS England, 
2014a, NHS England, 2014b, NHS England, 2014c, NHS England, 2015), and analysed these to 
uŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ ?ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ?(Weiss, 1998)  underlying the  policy. Often implicit rather 
than explicit, programme theories represent the causal assumptions underlying policy. They embody 
official expectations as to how proffered policy solutions will alleviate or ameliorate identified policy 
problems.  In the documents we reviewed it was argued that: 
x Primary care needs to change to meet demographic challenges; 
x CCG-control over the primary care budget will enable transfer of resources from secondary 
care into primary care; 
x CCG commissioning of primary care will support integrated care; 
x CCGs will be able to invest in primary care, making it sustainable for the future (McDermott 
et al., 2016). 
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We tested these theories with senior policy makers by conducting six individual face to face or 
telephone interviews with representatives of the organisations involved in co-commissioning policy, 
including: the Department of Health; NHS England; and NHS Clinical Commissioners. The interviews 
were carried out in June/July 2015. Interviewees were asked  to explain what they thought the main 
 ?problems ? were with the commissioning of primary care services and to describe how the 
developing policy would address these. These interviews were transcribed and analysed, and the 
responses were compared with the programme theories above. Finally, we explored the early stages 
of policy implementation, by carrying out a telephone survey with 49 senior leaders from CCGs 
across levels of co-commissioning responsibility in summer 2015. These were purposively selected 
across a number of characteristics, including: levels of co-commissioning; all regions of England; a 
variety of 'Ɛ ?sizes; those involved in other service redesign initiatives; and both urban and rural 
CCGs (see Table 1). Interviewees were asked to explain their aspirations for engaging with primary 
care co-commissioning, the factors underlying their choice of level of commissioning responsibility 
and their plans. Responses were tabulated in a spread-sheet for easy comparison. A full description 




Primary care co-commissioning in theory: what is it intended to achieve? 
Published guidance relating to primary care co-commissioning highlighted the need to bring 
together the commissioning of primary care services alongside other services, suggesting that 
separating the commissioning of different types of services had been counter-productive, preventing 
necessary integration: 
 
The introduction of co-commissioning is an essential step towards expanding and 
strengthening primary medical care. Co-commissioning is recognition that clinical 
commissioning groups (CCGs) are harnessing clinical insight and energy to drive changes in 
their local health systems that have not been achievable before now, but are hindered 
from taking an holistic and integrated approach to improving healthcare for their local 
populations, due to their lack of say over both primary care and some specialized service. 
(NHS England, 2014b p4) 
 
Interviews with policy makers and senior managers confirmed this, suggesting that problems 
associated with the model put in place under the HSCA12 were obvious from the beginning: 
 
 ? ? ?ǀĞƌǇĞĂƌůǇŽŶ ?ďŽƚŚŝŶƚŚĞǇĞĂƌŽƌƐŽůĞĂĚŝŶŐƵƉƚŽƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞŽŶ 1st April 2013, 
and increasingly after April 2013, once CCGs were doing this for real, people started to say, 
ƚŚŝƐŝƐŶ ?ƚƌĞĂůůǇǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ?ǁĞŐĞƚƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŚŽǁ'ƐĐŽƵůĚǁŽƌŬĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞE,^ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?
but partly because NHS England has a much reduced primary carecommissioning function, 
ŝƚĨĞĞůƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƌĞŵŽƚĞĨƌŽŵůŽĐĂůĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŝƚ ?ƐĂǀĞƌǇƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶĂůĨŽƌŵŽĨ
commissioning. [Policy maker ID5] 
 
The move towards  ?ƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ ?ǁĂƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚďǇseveral interviewees. Rather 
than taking a strategic approach to service development and contract management, lack of capacity 
meant that NHSE teams were focused upon making payments and checking that contract 
requirements had been met: 
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 ?part of the reason CCGs were so desperate to take on general practice commissioning 
was that in the two years NHS England had been doing it, almost nothing had happened.  
So the teams were too small, they were covering huge geographical areas, and they were 
purely doing contracting and making payments, there was no commissioning of primary 
care going on at all. [Policy maker ID4]  
 
Importantly, the relational aspects of contracting which have been shown to be important in a 
publicly funded health system (Allen, 2002) were felt to be attenuated. For example staff who knew 
their local primary care providers were moved on or made redundant, and those remaining were felt 
to be remote: 
 
The reality of NHS England regional teams is the capacity there is diminishing all the time 
and they are quite remote from the areas now.  So there is very little to maintain that 
relationship between NHS England and practices. .. [Policy maker ID1] 
 
Some interviewees went further, identifying many of the changes introduced by the HSCA12 as 
unhelpful, and suggesting that further policy change was needed: 
 
Actually, I think co-commissioning was, if you like, almost like a sticky plaster to start trying 
ƚŽďƵŝůĚƚŚĂƚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌĂŶĚƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐƚŽƌĞƉůĂĐĞƐŽŵĞŽĨǁŚĂƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶůŽƐƚ ? ? ? ?/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞ
view of many - maybe not all - is that the ,ĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚ^ŽĐŝĂůĂƌĞĐƚ ? ? ?ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇďĞĐĂŵĞĂ
factor in terms of it fragmenting the commissioning of services, which meant that there 
was a step back from being able to develop a greater sense of, I suppose, local ownership 
and, indeed, a strategic overview of what, from a clinical perspective and from a local 
perspective, we wanted to achieve. [Policy maker ID1]  
 
The HSCA12 divided responsibilities for primary care, with so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ?ĐŽƌĞ ?ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐďĞŝŶŐ
commissionĞĚďǇE,^ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ ?ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ ?ŽƌĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ'Ɛ. 
In our historical review we highlighted the fact that having a core national contract for the majority 
of primary care services limits ƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽďĞůŽĐĂůůǇƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞ ?dŚĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ?ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ ?ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ
ƐĐŚĞŵĞƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚŽǀĞƌĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨǇĞĂƌƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ ?ǁŽƌŬĂƌŽƵŶĚƐ ?ƚŽĂůůŽǁĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐƚŽ
invest in local services and give them some levers for change. However, as this senior policy actor 
highlights, sometimes what is required is simply more of the core services: 
 
.... we could always invest in enhanced services or different things, or extra things, but 
actually what we probably need is just more core [services], more people seeing more 
patients, and doing core general practice with them. [Policy maker ID4] 
 
Other interviewees talked about moving towards Ă ?ƉůĂĐĞ-ďĂƐĞĚ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ
services. This approach focuses upon the services needed in a geographical area, aiming to integrate 
and remove the divisions between primary, secondary and community care: 
 
^ŽĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇǁŚĂƚǁĞ ?ǀĞďĞĞŶĚŽŝŶŐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞůĂƐƚǇĞĂƌŝƐƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƌĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ
things that the 2012 Act disconnected. So there were a number of very good things in the 
Act, I think the clinically led CCG commissioning was an important step.  But effectively 
what happened to commissioning was it got split into very different directions, so you had 
Public Health, bits of it going to local government, bits of it staying with NHS England, you 
then had primary care and specialist services with NHS England, the rest of healthcare 
commissioning with CCGs and local government social care commissioning somewhere 
ĞůƐĞ ?ŶĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇǁŚĂƚǁĞ ?ĚďĞĞŶƐĂǇŝŶŐ ? is what we neeĚŝĨǁĞ ?ƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽĂĐƚĂƐ
effective agents for the public in local areas we need place based commissioning. So as far 
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ĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞůĞƚ ?ƐƚƌǇĂŶĚŵĞƐŚƚŚĞŵŽŶĞǇĂŶĚůĞƚ ?ƐƚƌǇĂŶĚůŝŶŬŶŽƚũƵƐƚƚŚĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐďŝƚƐŽĨ
the health service together but other parts of the public sector so that we can commission 
services in an integrated way and have trade-offs between different bits of the system. 
[Policy maker ID2] 
 
However, doing this requires flexibility between funding streams, and ability to pool resources: 
 
^Ž ?ĨŽƌĂŐŝǀĞŶƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂĨŝŶŝƚĞƐĞƚŽĨƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇƐƉůŝƚĂŶƵŵďĞƌ
ŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚǁĂǇƐ ?/ƚ ?ƐƐƉůŝƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶ'Ɛ ?E,^ŶŐůĂŶĚĂŶĚůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŵŽƐƚ
obviously.   ?And place based commissioning, to my mind, is essentially about saying  ? we 
need to now allow local commissioners who understand the health needs of this 
population, to take a single view about how we best deploy that single set of resources to 
buy the best healthcare services, and produce the best health outcomes.[Policy maker ID5] 
 
Taken together, these accounts suggest a policy aiming to tackle many of the issues raised in our 
historical review. In particular, the need for locally-sensitive decision making, and a desire to be able 
to shift resources between different types of services. However, other issues, such as the need to 
harmonize between the different contract types and, most notably, the problems associated with a 
national contract model which determines the majority of practice income, were left unaddressed.  
 
Primary care co-commissioning in practice: what were CCGs intending to do? 
Taking on responsibility for co-commissioning primary care was initially voluntary, with CCGs 
required to opt for one of three levels: fully delegated commissioning; joint commissioning, sharing 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇǁŝƚŚE,^ ?ĂŶĚ ?ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ? ?ǁŝƚŚE,^ƌĞƚĂŝŶŝŶŐŵŽƐƚĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƌŽůĞ. The 
greatest number of CCGs initially ŽƉƚĞĚĨŽƌ ?ũŽŝŶƚ ?ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ (87 out of 209 CCGs). However, it 
rapidly became clear that there was little difference between the levels, and that there was a policy 
intention that all CCGs would move quite quickly to take on full delegated responsibility. 
 
In our telephone survey, participants were asked to explain their rationale for taking on 
responsibility for commissioning primary care. Their responses made it clear that one of the main 
problems that had been experienced following the HSCA12 had been the loss of local knowledge in 
the commissioning of primary care services. NHSE was felt to be remote, lacking the necessary 
understanding of local providers. We asked CCG leaders an open question as to the principle drivers 
underlying their adoption of the particular level of responsibility they had chosen. Of the 37 
interviewees from CCGs opting to take delegated responsibility, 20 highlighted the opportunity to 
bring back local knowledge and control into the commissioning process as one of their most 
important drivers. They cited: knowledge about local practices ? performance and capabilities; 
understanding of issues related to premises; and awareness of the needs of their local populations 
as being important.  Two suggested that they felt they ŚĂĚ ?ŶŽĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ďƵƚƚŽƚĂŬĞŽŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?
whilst others referred to a variety of drivers such as an opportunity to develop better relationships 
with their member practices and an ability to look holistically at the primary care services. When 
asked about the benefits which might accrue from their new responsibilities, a number of 
interviewees argued that they would be in a better position to performance manage their practices 
than NHSE. In contrast to the senior policy makers, only one interviewee mentioned the ability to 
ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŶĞǁŵŽĚĞůƐŽĨĐĂƌĞ ?ĂŶĚŽŶĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ?ƉůĂĐĞ-ďĂƐĞĚ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽcare.  
 
When asked about their areas of focus, most described plans to streamline the additional funding 
streams flowing into general practice. As highlighted in our historical review, the funding of general 
practice in the UK is extremely complicated, witŚƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ ?ƚŽƉƉĞĚƵƉ ?ďǇĂ
ǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨ ?ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ ?ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?dŚŽƐĞŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĂŶĂƉƉĞƚŝƚĞƚŽƐƚƌĞĂŵůŝŶĞƚŚĞƐĞ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ
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at the same time addressing historical funding discrepancies which had entered the system in the 
1990s when PMS contracts were introduced. This was acknowledged as being a difficult task, with 
some explaining that practices in their area might lose considerable amounts of funding. However, in 
managing these difficult issues, they again cited their local knowledge and understanding as being an 
important asset.  
 
This focus upon local knowledge and understanding of local services fits with what is known in the 
wider literature relating to implementing service changes. Best et al (2012) reviewed 84 studies of 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?ĂŶĚĚŝƐƚŝůůĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐĞĨŝǀĞ ?ƐŝŵƉůĞƌƵůĞƐ ? ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĂŶĞĞĚƚŽ
 ?ĂƚƚĞŶĚƚŽŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?dŚĞǇĚƌĂǁĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ ?ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇŝŶĐůƵĚĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨ
what has happened before, but also requires understanding of local social processes and the local 
norms and values underpinning service delivery (Best et al., 2012 p439). Our interviewees suggested 
that such deep contextual understanding was vital in ensuring that services adapted to meet 
changing patient needs.  
 
Finally, when asked about problems and concerns regarding the process of taking on responsibility 
for the commissioning of primary care services, our interviewees highlighted three main issues. 
Firstly, there was concern about resources. This encompassed both the availability of resources to 
invest in primary care services, and the managerial resources they needed to undertake the work 
required. CCGs have taken on responsibility for co-commissioning without any additional managerial 
funding, and this is a concern for many. Secondly, CCGs were concerned about their relationship 
with member practices. CCGs are constituted as membership organisations, and are therefore 
effectively commissioning and policing themselves. There is considerable scope for conflicts of 
interest, and concern that they may alienate their members as they, for example, withdraw funding 
from PMS practices. Finally, responsibility for commissioning primary care services has been 
delegated to CCGs without any change in legislation. This means that NHSE retains statutory 
responsibility, even though day-to-day responsibility is delegated to CCGs. This had caused problems 
for some CCGs during the handover, particularly those small CCGs that wished to work in 
collaboration with their neighbours. Some CCGs told us that they felt that the guidance surrounding 
the transfer of responsibilities was late to be issued, with a sense that NHSE had to react to issues as 
they arose rather than having a clear plan.  
 
Discussion 
The recent history of the commissioning of primary care services in England since 2010 resonates 
ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇǁŝƚŚ>ŝŶĚďůŽŵ ?ƐĐĂůůĨŽƌ ?ƐŬŝůĨƵůŝŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞŶƐƐ ?ŝŶƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂŶĚĚĞƐŝŐŶ(Lindblom, 
1979 p524). The HSCA12 attempted a wholesale redesign of the English NHS, specifying, 
reorganising and legislating for all aspects of the system (Timmins, 2012). The rapid need (after only 
a year) to revisit one of the elements of NHS services (i.e. primary care) suggests that this attempt at 
completeness had fallen short. The resulting change  ? handing responsibility for primary care 
planning back to local level - appears to represent a return to the dominant model of primary care 
policy development identified in our historical review: incremental adjustment to meet specific 
issues or concerns, as Lindblom advocated. However, the legislative legacy of the HSCA12 remains, 
with some evidence of problems associated with the staffing and statutory responsibilities 
associated with the commissioning of primary care services, as well as continuing concerns about 
potential conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the legacy and path dependence (David, 1985) arising 
out of the initial NHS establishment of GPs as independent contractors also remains in the complex 
patchwork of contracts and payment models.  
 
What can be learnt from this experience that is of relevance to the planning and management of 
primary care services more generally? Firstly, our findings chime with the view of major system 
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change seen through a complexity lens. Complexity scientists argue that reorganisations affecting 
complex systems will result in unpredictable and emergent changes (Anderson and McDaniel (Jr), 
2000, Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001). Whilst this may seem self-ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚ ?ŝƚƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƐ>ŝŶĚďůŽŵ ?ƐĐĂůů
for cautious and incremental policy change rather than wholesale reorganisation. Our findings speak 
to the impossibility of foreseeing and pre-emptively managing all of the consequences of such a 
reorganisation, and suggest that those responsible for health systems elsewhere would be well 
advised to proceed cautiously and incrementally as they seek to optimise system performance. 
ƵŝůĚŝŶŐŝŶ ?ŝŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞŶĞƐƐ ?(Lindblom, 1979 p524) rather than seeking tidy legislative closure may 
be beneficial. 
 
Secondly, our analysis of the post 2010 policy context makes it clear that the changes to primary 
care enacted by the HSCA12 were largely driven by two things: a desire for consistency and end to 
 ?ƵŶǁĂƌƌĂŶƚĞĚǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĚƌŝǀĞƚŽĂǀŽŝĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?>ŽĐĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ
was to be delivered by a local function within the new national body, NHS England, but this was 
quickly lost in an early reorganisation and reduction in staffing. Our respondents  ? at local and policy 
level  ? were unanimous in highlighting the need for local oversight, contextual knowledge and good 
relationships in managing the realities of providing universal coverage of patient-facing services, and 
it would seem that this is an important lesson from the English experiment. Notwithstanding the 
desire for consistency in service availability and quality, strong local oversight, with sufficient 
managerial staff who possess the requisite contextual understanding of local services is essential.  
 
Since 2014 there has been an explosion of new initiatives and pilots in the NHS in England, many 
designed to address some of the problems that we have highlighted. These include Vanguards, 
which incentivisĞŐƌŽƵƉƐĂƚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůĞǀĞůƐĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŽĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ ?ŶĞǁŵŽĚĞůƐ ?ŽĨ
care (NHS England, 2016a). These are intended to pilot new forms of primary care contract, based 
on some form of capitation payment with incentives to improve population health and reduce use of 
expensive hospital services (Kaffash and Matthews-King, 2015). We have highlighted the path 
dependency embedded in the current system, with a ĐŽŵƉůĞǆǁĞďŽĨĐŽƌĞĂŶĚ ?ĂĚĚŽŶ ?Đontractual 
arrangements having accrued over time. The new forms of contract proposed to support the 
development of new ways of working are intended to address this complexity, streamlining 
incentives and harmonising services (NHS England 2016a). However, in practice primary care 
providers have not shown themselves to be eager to move from a complicated but familiar and 
predictable contract to one in which the potential rewards are unclear, and it is now suggested that 
the new contract  might simƉůǇďĞĂĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĂĚĚŽŶ ?Ă ?ǀŝƌƚƵĂůĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ? ?NHS England 2016b p20)) to 
the base contract. However this latest policy plays out, our study and the evidence relating to 
previous attempts to change contracts (Gillam et al, 2012) both suggest that there is clear potential 
for unintended consequences. Future research is needed not only to investigate the outcomes of 
any new contractual arrangements, but also to further explore how local contract management is 
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Policy makers in England and internationally wrestle with planning and providing healthcare 
services in ways which improve outcomes and reduce costs. A strong primary care sector is an 
important asset, but it is not clear how best to achieve this. Our study of the impact of recent 
extensive changes to the English health system highlights the impossibility of fully predicting the 
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We show that, whatever funding mechanism is chosen, it is important that primary care service 
planning is decentralized to a regional organisational tier with detailed local knowledge. 
